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Abstract
Many policy analyses on COVID-19 have been focusing on 
what kind of policies are implemented to contain the spread 
of COVID-19. What seems equally important to explore are 
the social and political consequences of the confinement 
policies. Does the public support strict confinement poli-
cies? What are the social, political, and psychological con-
sequences of the confinement policies? The question of how 
legitimate a policy is among the public is at the core of dem-
ocratic theory. Its relevance also stems from the expected 
consequences of public support on behavior: The more 
someone supports a policy, the more someone is likely to 
follow the policy even if the policy is not strictly enforced. 
In this paper, we will focus on Germany, briefly summarize 
the main policies during the first 6 weeks of confinement 
and then explore political attitudes, risk perceptions, and the 
social consequences of the lockdown.
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1 |  INTRODUCTION
Many policy analyses of the COVID-19 pandemic have focused on what kind of policies are imple-
mented to contain the spread of the disease and on how effective these policies are in reducing the 
number of new infections and deaths. What seems equally important to explore are the political, so-
cial, and psychological consequences of the containment policies. In this paper, we focus on Germany 
and provide an overview of the main policies that were implemented in an attempt to halt the spread 
of COVID-19 during the first 8 weeks of confinement. We complement this with results of a daily 
survey, the German Internet Panel (GIP), which allows us to capture the immediate political, social, 
and psychological consequences of the confinement.
First, does the public support strict confinement policies, and how does this support change over 
time? The question of how legitimate a policy is among the public and how public opinion and policies 
are linked is a prominent and widely researched topic in political and social sciences. Theoretical and 
empirical research support the claim that it is, in fact, an interrelationship: public opinion affects poli-
cy-making (Brooks & Manza, 2006; Burstein, 2003; Page & Shapiro, 1983) and policies affect public 
opinion (Ebbinghaus & Naumann, 2017; Mettler & Soss, 2004; Pierson, 1993). These policy feedback 
effects then, in turn, alter attitudes (Kumlin & Stadelmann-Steffen, 2014). As lockdown policies have 
been so quickly introduced and as the public most likely did not have any attitude regarding these 
policies before the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic, this seems to be one of the few examples where 
policies were clearly enacted before the emergence of public opinion. Hence, we focus rather on how 
the lockdown policies might have affected public attitudes. Skocpol (1992:58) refers to policy feedback 
as the ways “policies, once enacted, restructure subsequent political processes,” and Pierson (1993) 
distinguishes two main types of feedback effects. First, resource and incentive effects link policies to 
the self-interest of people since they determine how resources are distributed, provide incentives, and 
thus shape the costs and benefits of actors. Hence, we would expect that the more threatened people 
feel by the pandemic, the higher they perceive the risk of being infected to be, and the lower their sup-
port is. Moreover, the more apparent the economic costs of the lockdown become over time, the lower 
the support should be. Second, interpretative effects provide a mechanism to link policies and attitudes 
via values since they serve as sources of information and meaning. For example, policies “frame the 
meaning and origins of societal problems by identifying target groups for government action and 
defining solutions” (Mettler & Soss, 2004:62). Let us take the labor market and possible reasons for 
unemployment as an example. When the government promotes job-training programs, the focus is 
on a lack of skills, and when wage subsidies are introduced, the focus is on the structural limitations 
of the labor market and potential consequences of globalization, whereas strict regulations of the ac-
cess to unemployment benefits shifts the focus to individual behavior and self-discipline (Gusmano, 
Schlesinger, & Thomas, 2002). So, policies can alter frames and the way people think about an issue 
(Chong & Druckman, 2007) and we expect that policies themselves shape the framing and perception 
of the pandemic and should have an effect on reform preferences but also on risk perceptions.
Second, we explore the social consequences of the lockdown and particularly focus on the labor 
market. The closure of non-essential businesses but also macro-economic consequences of the global 
COVID-19 crisis had an immediate effect on the labor market and led to lay-offs and short-time work 
(see for example Fuchs-Schündeln, Kuhn, & Tertilt, 2020). Moreover, many employers extended pos-
sibilities for remote work and flexible work arrangements so that employees had the opportunity to 
work and to stay at home. At the same time, employees in essential areas of the economy who are not 
able to work remotely face an increased risk of being infected. Do these negative consequences affect 
everyone equally? We would rather expect the opposite. Germany's labor market is characterized by 
a pronounced “insider–outsider” divide and has a considerable amount of low wage and fixed-term 
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employment, while the core workforce in standard employment is well protected by labor regulations 
(Emmenegger, Häusermann, Palier, Seeleib-Kaiser, 2012). Hence, immediate lay-offs, for example, 
are not possible for those in regular employment. Furthermore, labor market measures to buffer the 
negative crisis consequences for employees and companies are mostly targeted at the core workforce. 
As for the possibilities to work remotely, most jobs in which this is a viable option are in well-paid 
occupations that require a high level of education (Dingel & Neiman, 2020). In summary, we expect 
that existing social inequalities will rather be increased by the confinement policies.
Third, we examine the psychological consequences of the lockdown. We explore the extent to 
which people feel threatened by COVID-19. Feelings of threat play an important role in shaping atti-
tudes and behavior. If threat perceptions are too low, people might not support confinement policies 
or might not follow them if they are not strictly enforced. Too strong threat perceptions might impair 
people in their daily lives if, for example, they do not leave their home any more. Moreover, there is 
a growing political economy literature that argues that subjective (mis-)perceptions of societal trends 
are very important in explaining political attitudes and behavior. For example, Alesina, Miano, and 
Stantcheva (2018) show that natives’ usually overestimate the share of migrants and underestimate 
their labor market integration. These misperceptions are then one important factor in understanding 
anti-migrant attitudes. Similarly, we would expect that people rather overestimate their own infection 
risk (overestimation of small probabilities) but over time they might adapt their perceptions to reality 
(see Breznau, 2020).
In what follows, we will first provide a brief overview of how the COVID-19 pandemic unfolded 
in Germany and how the government reacted to it. This provides the background against which we 
will then present our results and will show how public attitudes and perceptions changed during this 
period.
2 |  COVID-19 POLICIES IN GERMANY
In Figure 1, we provide a summary of the first half of 2020 and show daily case numbers and the 
cumulative numbers of deaths in Germany. Moreover, the government response index shows the 
reaction of the German government to the pandemic aggregating containment and closure policies, 
economic policies, and health system policies (Hale, Webster, Phillips, & Kira, 2020).
The initial period of the COVID-19 pandemic in Germany resembles very much the experience 
of many other European countries. The government knew about COVID-19 in China and its potential 
threat also for Europe already in late December 2019. Yet, the first confirmed case in Germany was 
found on January 27, 2020. The government response to this was the introduction of contact tracing 
systems, the mandated isolation of the few infected people, and a first information campaign mainly 
recommending good hand hygiene and reassuring the population that the isolation of the infected 
worked well in keeping the virus at bay. The situation did not change until the end of February when 
the number of confirmed infections started to increase, in particular in some local hotspots. Moreover, 
the Italian experience with the pandemic led to doubts that it would be possible to contain the virus 
in Germany by the initial measures that had been taken. “The situation in Italy also changes our as-
sessment of the situation: Corona has arrived in Europe as a pandemic" German health minister Jens 
Spahn remarked on February 24th. Yet, the government was still reticent to introduce strict lockdown 
measures. It was recommended to cancel big public events of more than 1,000 participants, and it 
was also recommended to close schools and childcare if confirmed infections were established. At 
the same time, large public events like the carnival in Cologne took place as planned with several 
thousand attendees.
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This changed very quickly in mid-March, when the number of daily cases increased within 2 weeks 
from less than 100 to 4,000 (see Figure 1) and as also the first COVID-19-related deaths were re-
corded. On March 12, schools and childcare facilities were closed and the government issued rec-
ommendations regarding social distancing. On March 17th, the borders were closed, and on March 
18th, Chancellor Angela Merkel announced the general lockdown with stay-at-home orders. "This is 
serious," she remarked in her speech to the nation "Please, take it seriously, too." These measures 
went into effect on March 21st and were then further extended twice until the beginning of May. At the 
same time, the government reassured the population that they would do everything necessary to buffer 
the negative consequences of the lockdown. The debt brake was suspended, and the government an-
nounced an extra federal budget of 150 billion euros. Short-time work (“Kurzarbeit”) was introduced 
which allows firms to temporarily reduce hours worked while providing employees with income sup-
port from the state for the hours not worked. On April 22nd, the subsidy was increased to up to 80% of 
the regular salary. In mid-April, some states started to make the wearing of face coverings obligatory 
in public transportation and shops. By April 27th, face masks were obligatory in public transportation 
and shops in all German states.
Germany reached its peak of the first wave in terms of daily infections in early April when the 
5-day moving average of new infections per day reached almost 6,000. Yet, the lockdown and stay-
at-home orders which had gone into effect on March 21st seem to have been very effective since case 
numbers decreased quickly in the second half of April, and also, the increase in the number of deaths 
slowed down in the beginning of May when it has reached about 8,000 deaths.
The government (and the public) started to discuss re-opening plans at the end of March, and 
the first restrictions were lifted in May. As we are mainly interested in the public reactions to 
the lockdown, we restrict the following analysis to the time between March 20 (i.e. from when 
survey data is available) and May 14 when the first re-openings occurred (marked in gray in 
Figure 1).
F I G U R E  1  On infections, deaths, and government response in Germany, January 1, – June 30, 2020
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In summary, having a high performing medical system but little past experience with pandemics, 
Germany tended to show a later, slower, and weaker policy response compared to some other coun-
tries (Capano, Howlett, Jarvis, Ramesh, & Goyal, 2020).
3 |  DATA AND ANALYSIS
To capture public reactions of the German population, we use data from the German Internet Panel (GIP). 
The GIP is based on a random probability sample of the general population in Germany aged 16 to 75. The 
study started in 2012 and was supplemented with additional participants in 2014 and 2018. The panel partic-
ipants were recruited offline using strict statistical procedures (Blom, Gathmann, & Krieger, 2015). Every 
other month, panel participants are invited to take part in a voluntary online survey. For the Mannheim 
Corona Study (MCS), the GIP launched a special survey on March 20th. The sample was divided into 
eight random subsamples. The subsamples 1–7 were assigned to a specific day of the week, while the 
eighth subsample serves as control group and is not surveyed. Within one week, the questionnaire remains 
exactly the same for all participants. Between 411 and 643 (on average 489) respondents take part in the 
study every day, allowing for the analysis of daily but also weekly changes in attitudes and behavior.
In our analysis, we use a response propensity weight, which projects the characteristics of the 
MSC participants to the general GIP study using data on employment status and occupational sector. 
Moreover, a raking weight was used to extrapolate the characteristics of MSC participants to those of 
the general population of Germany based on age, gender, marital status, level of education, household 
size, and federal state.
We use two survey questions as indicators for the “public support for” and “evaluation of” the 
lockdown policies. Respondents are asked whether they think that the societal benefits of the current 
policies outweigh their economic costs. Answer categories ranged from 1, the societal benefits are 
greater than the economic costs to 7, and the economic costs are greater than the societal benefits. 
We also provided respondents with a list of lockdown policies, and respondents should choose all the 
policy measures they think are appropriate to deal with the COVID-19 pandemic (see Appendix for 
the exact wording of questions).
To examine the economic consequences of the lockdown, we explore how the employment situation 
changes over time. We distinguish four different employment status (employed, short-time work, fur-
loughed with and without pay, and unemployed) and also whether the employed work on-site or remotely.
Finally, we explore the psychological reactions of the public focusing on how threatened people 
feel by the COVID-19 pandemic, how they rate their individual infection risk and their ability to con-
trol an infection, and the perceived likelihood of severe illness if infected (see Appendix for the exact 
wording of questions and response scale).
Daily data on policies are available from January 1, 2020, and the survey data are available on a 
daily basis starting on March 20, 2020. As we are primarily interested in the lockdown policies and 
their effect on the public, we restrict our analysis to the period between March 20, 2020, to May 14, 
2020. In mid-May, Germany began to gradually lift some of the lockdown measures and started to 
re-open the country.
4 |  RESULTS
How did the public react to the lockdown measures? We first look at political reactions and distinguish 
between performance evaluations and support for specific policies. Figure 2 shows how the public 
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evaluates the consequences of the lockdown policies. We reversed the scale in the questionnaire so 
that higher values on the 7-point scale mean that the population thinks that the societal benefits are 
greater than the economic costs. We see that at the beginning of our period of observation, at the 
peak of the first wave and briefly after strict lockdown measures had been introduced, that the public 
evaluates the policies quite positively and in general supports the evaluation that the societal benefits 
of the lockdown outweigh its economic costs. This evaluation remains stable at around 4.6 during the 
first two weeks but then begins to steadily decline already in early April and continues to drop week-
on-week until the beginning of May. At the end of our period of observation, the evaluation dropped 
below 4 on the 7-point scale as around 50% of the population in Germany felt that the lockdown had 
more negative than positive consequences.
In Figure 3, we move from the general performance evaluation to support for specific lockdown 
measures. The graph shows which share of the population supported each of six different policies. 
We see that most of the policies receive tremendous support in the first weeks of the lockdown. More 
than 90% of the population supported closing public facilities (like schools and universities), closing 
borders, and prohibiting public gatherings with more than 100 participants. A lockdown and strict 
stay-at-home order also received majority support. The public was more critical toward closing pub-
lic transportation and also toward tracking mobile phones of infected people without their consent, 
although notably about a third did support such a policy. Over time, with declining case numbers and 
higher awareness for the economic costs of the lockdown measures, support steadily declined for all 
policies. We observe the steepest decline in support for closing public facilities which fell from 95% 
support in week 1 to around 40% support at the beginning of May. The population in Germany became 
equally critical toward a stay-at-home order and slightly less than 10% of the population supported a 
stay-at-home order in May. Other measures lost support, including banning international travel (−25 
percentage points) and prohibiting gatherings of more than 100 participants (−5 percentage points). 
Briefly before the first re-opening started, a majority still supported these two measures. Also, only 
very few people (around 5%) did not support any of the lockdown measures. Overall, during the 
lockdown, the public in Germany became most critical about those policies which had the strongest 
F I G U R E  2  Evaluation of the lockdown policies
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
P
ol
ic
y 
ev
al
ua
tio
n
March 20-26
March 27 - April 2
April 3-9
April 10-16
April 17-23
April 24-30
May 1-7
May 8-14
Source: Mannheimer Corona Survey
   | 7NAUMANN et Al.
negative impact on their daily lives, such as the measures regarding the closures of public facilities 
and stay-at-home orders, whereas banning international travel or prohibiting larger public events were 
still supported by a majority. Although our empirical data only provide evidence on one very strict 
version of a tracking and tracing policy, the results suggest that the public sees a benefit in these kinds 
of measures as support did not decline very much over time.
In addition to the political consequences, the lockdown also had negative effects on the economy 
and the labor market in particular. Here, we focus on the workforce and explore who is affected most 
by the negative consequences of the lockdown. Does the COVID-19 crisis increase existing social in-
equalities? Our results suggest that it does. Figure 5 shows the employment situation depending on the 
level of school education, and we distinguish between low (without or with basic school-leaving quali-
fications—Hauptschulabschluss), middle (intermediate school-leaving qualification—Mittlere Reife), 
and high (with higher education entrance qualification (Fach-Hochschulreife) education) levels. We 
restrict our analysis to those respondents who were employed before the lockdown (i.e., in January 
2020). Hence, our results show which groups were able to keep their jobs, who switched to remote 
work, but who lost their job, were furloughed or were sent on short-time work.
Overall, our results show that the lower the level of education, the higher the proportion of people 
who changed to short-time work, to furlough without pay, or who were laid off (Figure 4). Job loss 
for someone with a low or middle education is twice as likely as for someone with a high level of 
education. Among those who kept their jobs and were able to work about the same hours as in January 
2020, employees with a high level of school education are more often working remotely (more than 
40 percent in March and April) than employees with a lower level of education. The majority of 
those with a low or medium school education work on-site (between 62 – 64 percent in March). In 
summary, high education reduces the risk of job loss and at the same time provides the privilege to 
work remotely. The negative consequences of the COVID-19 lockdown hence increase existing social 
inequalities along two dimensions. The lower educated lost their jobs, were suspended without pay, or 
experienced a partial income loss by short-time work to a much higher degree than higher educated 
F I G U R E  3  Support for specific lockdown policies in Germany
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workers. What's more, if they were able to keep their jobs, they tended have to work on-site, facing 
higher risks of infection.
These social inequalities are linked to political attitudes and policy evaluations. Additional analy-
ses (not shown here) confirm that the lower educated are much more critical of the lockdown policies 
and rather tend to say that the economic costs are higher than the societal benefits.
F I G U R E  4  Employment situation of the workforce in Germany—for different educational levels
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To better understand public reactions to the lockdown in Germany, we argue that it is crucial to 
look more specifically at public perceptions. In Figure 5, we show how threatened the public felt by 
the COVID-19 pandemic and how the population rated its own infection risk (both on the left y-scale). 
Moreover, we explore whether people thought that they were at risk of a severe illness if infected and 
whether they felt in control of their own infection risk.
In the first two weeks, shortly after the lockdown had been introduced but before the peak of the 
first wave of infections, threat perceptions were highest and the population rated the degree they felt 
personally threatened above 5 on the 11-point scale ranging from 0 (indicating no perceived threat 
at all) to 10 (indicating an extreme perceived threat to me). Also, the population thinks that almost 
15 out of 100 people will get infected in the next 7 days. This is a very major overestimation of 
the actual infection risk. Both the threat perception and the individual infection risk then steadily 
decreased over time. In contrast, the subjective risk assessment of having a severe illness in case 
of infection and also the feeling of having control over an infection remains more stable over time. 
In summary, the steady decrease of feelings of threat and perceived risk might be one explanation 
for why the lockdown slowly lost public support over time. Additional analyses show that such a 
correlation also exists at the individual level, as the more someone felt threatened, the higher degree 
of support they indicated for lockdown policies and the more positive was their overall evaluation 
of the benefits of the lockdown.
5 |  CONCLUSION AND DISCUSSION
In this paper, we have summarized the political response to the COVID-19 pandemic in Germany and 
focused on the period between the occurrence of the first case in January to the end of the lockdown 
in mid-May 2020. Our analysis shows that Germany followed a containment strategy for the first 
2 months until mid-March, focusing on isolation of the infected and on contact tracing but refraining 
from stricter policy measures which would affect the daily life of those not infected. This changed 
very quickly during the first two weeks of March when the daily new cases increased from below 100 
to around 1,000. In response, Germany very quickly moved from a containment strategy to a strategy 
focused on delaying the spread of the virus and within 3 weeks moved from prohibiting large events 
with more than 1,000 participants to a lockdown with a national stay-at-home order. Our analysis of 
survey data starting at the peak of the first wave briefly after the lockdown was introduced shows 
very high approval rates of these policy measures which might explain their success in effectively 
delaying the spread and reducing new infections to below 1,000 per day by mid-May. Also, Germany 
managed to keep the number of deaths at a very low level throughout the crisis (see contributions by 
Malandrino (2020) on Italy and by Colfer (2020), covering the UK, in this issue).
Yet, our analysis also shows that the widespread support for the containment and delay policy mea-
sures steadily decreased over time as did feelings of threat and subjective risk perceptions. Moreover, 
the negative economic consequences of becoming unemployed or of moving to short-time work did 
not affect everyone equally but did track existing social inequalities. While economic and social pol-
icies provided support to buffer these negative consequences in the short run, it is unclear whether 
the policies will also be able to adequately address medium- and long-term consequences of the lock-
down. Hence, the conclusions and policy implications drawn from our analysis are clearly limited to 
these short-term effects and are clearly hampered by the fact that we are trying to explore an ongoing 
phenomenon. The external validity of our findings for other countries and institutional settings is of 
course also hampered by the specificities of the German case. Germany has a strong economy and 
labor market, a comparably well-functioning welfare state, and a stable government that has been in 
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office for several years. This might explain both the success but also the high approval of the lockdown 
policies in the country (Breznau, 2020).
In summary, our analysis clearly shows that the lockdown policies feed back into the political 
process by altering political attitudes and public risk perceptions (Pierson,  1993; Skocpol,  1992). 
This raises some doubts that the acceptance of policies and the willingness of citizens to comply with 
lockdown measures during a potential second wave would be as widespread and as strong as they were 
during the first wave of the pandemic. Information campaigns, a societal discussion reflecting on the 
experiences of the lockdown, but also social policies that address some of the social inequalities the 
pandemic has exposed (see for example Lynch, 2020) might help to prepare the population for subse-
quent waves and for subsequent pandemics.
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APPENDIX 
Concept Question text (English translation)
Policy evaluation What do you think about the consequences of the current confinement policies 
in Germany: are the economic costs greater than the societal benefits, or are the 
societal benefits greater than the economic costs?
1—The societal benefits are greater than the economic costs.
…
7—The economic costs are greater than the societal benefits.
Policy support Which of the following policy measures do you think are appropriate for dealing 
with the current situation?
Please tick all that apply.
- Closing public facilities (e.g., universities, schools, and nursery schools)
- Closing boarders
- Prohibit events and public gatherings with more than 100 participants
- General stay-at-home order
- Closing of public transportation
- Tracking of mobile phones of infected persons for contact tracing (without 
consent)
- I do not support any of these measures.
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Concept Question text (English translation)
Threat To what degree do you feel personally threatened by the coronavirus pandemic?
no threat at all to me
…
10 extreme threat to me
Risk We would like to know how likely you think it is that you or someone like you will 
be infected with COVID in the next 7 days. Please think of 100 persons who are 
very similar to you, that is, they have a similar age, a similar health, live in your 
neighborhood, have a similar occupation and a similar lifestyle. What do you 
think, how many of these 100 persons will be infected with COVID in the next 
7 days?
Consequences If you would get the coronavirus, how likely would it be that your illness would so 
severe that you have to be treated in hospital?
1 not at all
…
7 in any case
Control What do you think to what extent you can affect the likelihood to be infected with 
the Corona virus in the next 7 days?
1 Not at all
…
7 entirely
